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This article proposes that what have been historically and contemporarily defined as
different domains of human cognition are served by one of four functionally- and
structurally-distinct areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Their contributions to human
intelligence are as follows: (a) BA9, enables our emotional intelligence, engaging the
psychosocial domain; (b) BA47, enables our practical intelligence, engaging the material
domain; (c) BA46 (or BA46-9/46), enables our abstract intelligence, engaging the
hypothetical domain; and (d) BA10, enables our temporal intelligence, engaging in
planning within any of the other three domains. Given their unique contribution to human
cognition, it is proposed that these areas be called the, social (BA9), material (BA47),
abstract (BA46-9/46) and temporal (BA10) mind. The evidence that BA47 participates
strongly in verbal and gestural communication suggests that language evolved primarily
as a consequence of the extreme selective pressure for practicality; an observation
supported by the functional connectivity between BA47 and orbital areas that negatively
reinforce lying. It is further proposed that the abstract mind (BA46-9/46) is the primary
seat of metacognition charged with creating adaptive behavioral strategies by generating
higher-order concepts (hypotheses) from lower-order concepts originating from the other
three domains of cognition.
Keywords: prefrontal cortex, emotional intelligence, practical intelligence, temporal intelligence, abstract
intelligence, metacognition, evolution of language, nature of lying
INTRODUCTION: COGNITION AND THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX
‘‘The specific histological differentiation of the cortical areas proves irrefutably their specific functional
differentiation. . . the large number of specially built structural regions points to a spatial separation of
many functions and. . . the sharply delimited localization of the physiological processes which correspond
to it.’’
Korbinian Brodmann (1868–1918)German Neurologist and Neuroanatomist.
Understanding the nature of human intelligence is perhaps the greatest challenge to modern
neuroscience, promising not only a comprehension of how humans have used cognition to
dominate all other life forms, but also opening the possibility of replication of our mental faculties
in the creation of systems that match or potentially exceed, our own extraordinary, cognitive
abilities. Although intelligence is usually referred to in the singular, there is considerable evidence
that it exists in multiple forms that potentially reflect different cognitive centers (Gardner, 1993;
Gray and Thompson, 2004).
The existence of multiple intelligences is implicit in the studies of the development of cognition
throughout childhood (Piaget et al., 1970, 1973). Thus, the development of cognition throughout
childhood has been shown to be divided into the following stages: (i) the preoperational (1–6 years),
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when the child’s preoccupations are almost entirely in the
psychosocial domain; (ii) the concrete operational (7–11 years),
when the child fully engages the physical/factual domain;
(iii) the formal operational (11–15), when the child engages
successfully in the hypothetical, abstract domain, while, in
addition, Piaget also regarded time as a discrete cognitive ability
that enables the co-seriation of tasks (Piaget and Pomerans,
1969; Sauer, in preparation). Alongside the development of
the child’s abilities to conceptualize the psychosocial, material
and hypothetical realms, it is now widely recognized that
the ability to plan or conceptualize the future is a fourth,
emergent domain of human mentality that is responsible
for what I will refer to as temporal intelligence (Piaget
and Pomerans, 1969; Allen et al., 1991; Benson, 1997); a
nomenclature for a cognitive domain that has very recently
been recognized as a necessary component in the creation of
robotic intelligence (Maniadakis and Trahanias, 2011, 2014,
2016; see: ‘‘The Origin of the Future: The Temporal Mind’’
Section).
Modern studies of cognition have confirmed previous
suspicions that cognition is a function of specific parts of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) the activation of which is accompanied
by the experience of thought (MacLean, 1990; Searle, 2000).
From their pioneering studies of the monkey PFC, Levy
and Goldman-Rakic have proposed ‘‘a modular ‘‘domain-
specific’’ model of PFC’s functional organization with respect
to working memory (WM) operations. In this model, the
dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) is composed of several subregions,
based primarily on the nature of the information being
processed inWM. Storage and processing functions are integrally
related in each area (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000, p. 23).
Because all the cytoarchitectonic areas in the human PFC
are present in macaque monkeys (Petrides and Pandya, 1999;
Petrides et al., 2012) and probably the apes (Semendeferi
et al., 2001) it would be reasonable to ask, whether, although
greatly attenuated, monkeys and/or apes might be availed of
cognitive domains more or less identical to those identified in
humans?
It is well known that apes, but not monkeys, can perform
Theory of Mind tasks (Byrne, 1995; Call, 2007; Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2009) and so qualify
for having a modicum of emotional intelligence. Furthermore,
apes and some monkey species have been observed making
simple tools, testifying that both groups of primates can manifest
practical intelligence (Byrne, 1995; Bortolini and Bicca-Marques,
2007; Lonsdorf et al., 2010; Haslam et al., 2013). Many studies of
cognition in the chimpanzee and the closely-related Bonobo or
pigmy chimp have shown significant domain-related differences
indicating that Bonobos are dominated by emotional intelligence
while practical intelligence exerts more control over chimp
behavior (McGrew, 1992, 2004; de Waal, 2006; Waal, 2007;
Matsuzawa, 2013). This hypothesis is supported by Herrmann
et al. (2010; p. 1) who upon comparing the performance of
chimpanzees and Bonobos on a wide range of cognitive problems
designed to test their understanding of the physical and social
world, concluding that; ‘‘Bonobos were more skilled at solving
tasks related to Theory of Mind or an understanding of social
causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at tasks requiring
the use of tools and an understanding of physical causality.’’
However, although Call has proposed that chimpanzees are
‘‘capable of knowledge abstraction to solve novel problems’’
(Call, 2001, p. 338), it is extremely difficult to design experiments
to reveal abstract intelligence in non-human primates (Byrne,
1995; Milner and Goodale, 2008; Snow, 2009, 2014; MacLean,
2016; Rosati and Santos, 2016). Nevertheless, it is this domain
of abstract intelligence that matures at the end of Piaget’s formal
operations stage, that is both the defining feature of humanity
and the origin of its innate ability to, in the practice of science,
transcend the physical and sensibly address the hypothetical.
There are only two alternative hypotheses that explain
how, during childhood the PFC could sequentially elaborate
four qualitatively different cognitive operations to serve the
psychosocial, material, temporal and hypothetical domains of
human thought. The first, postulates that all four of these
radically different domains of cognition are serviced by a
single area of cortex. If this were the case, then between the
beginning of the preoperational stage, at an age of approximately
1 year, until the establishment of the ability to perform formal
operations, around the end of the 15th year, this single area of
cortex would have to: (a) sequentially enable the development
of each of the four, vastly different, operational systems
(neural networks) required for emotional, temporal, practical
and abstract intelligence; and (b) maintain the independence
of these four domains of cognition, throughout adult life.
Under this hypothesis, the neural network responsible for
emotional intelligence would have to mature first, followed by
the progressive maturation of the neural networks underlying
temporal, practical and finally, abstract intelligence. Yet, each
would have to retain its isolation and independence of action. If
such an area of the cerebral cortex were to exist, then it would
essentially constitute the human mind.
While this first proposal is, theoretically, possible, suffice it to
say that the vast numbers of studies of cortical function have yet
to elucidate any area of cortex which can simultaneously serve
such radically different functions. Indeed, such a proposition
would be attune to suggesting that the diverse sensations of
vision, touch and hearing could each be effectively processed and
meaningfully represented by a single cortical area. It follows that
this first hypothesis is simply untenable.
The second hypothesis postulates that, the enabling of
each domain of cognition is dependent on the progressive
maturation of one of four circumscribed areas of the PFC. In
this process each area slowly becomes operational on a time
course paralleling the progressive appearance of the child’s
cognitive abilities to conceptualize the psychosocial, material
and hypothetical, while the temporal domain engages with
each in the progressive development of the child’s ability to
make plans. This proposal is completely compatible with the
rules that govern the development of all cytoarchitectonic areas
of the post-PFC, wherein: (a) each area of Brodmann serves
a discrete sensory, perceptual, motor or mnemonic function
and can be shown to have an identifiable place in human
experience (Snow and Wilson, 1991; Snow, 2009, 2014); and (b)
the PFC undergoes continuous structural and functional changes
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throughout childhood that are accompanied by the progressive
emergence of all four cognitive domains (Casey et al., 1997, 2000;
Diamond, 2000, 2002; Sowell et al., 2001; Adleman et al., 2002;
Durston et al., 2006; Huizinga et al., 2006; Rosenberg-Lee et al.,
2011; Baron and Leonberger, 2012; Dumontheil, 2014).
A vast amount of data have repeatedly implicated Brodmann’s
areas (BAs) 9, 10, 46 or 47 in specific cognitive challenges,
ranging from Theory of Mind tasks (Goel et al., 1995) to the
Stroop test (Friese et al., 2013). By necessity, these cognitive
challenges are always part of a specific protocol and a specific
experimental paradigm designed to test which of these areas
plays a role in that particular contemplative process. It is
hoped that from the careful documentation of the participation
or otherwise of each area in a multidomanial array of tasks,
eventually the functional identity of each will emerge, enabling
us to comprehend the constitution and variety of these cognitive
centers that, collectively, constitute the human mind. The
proposal that each cognitive area is the origin of a distinct domain
of thought is particularly interesting with respect to: (a) the
documentation of the large variation in the size of BAs 9 and 46 in
a small sample of normal adult brains (Rajkowska and Goldman-
Rakic, 1995); and (b) the malformation/function of these areas in
schizophrenia (Selemon et al., 1995; Guillozet-Bongaarts et al.,
2014) and autism (Critchley et al., 2000a; Schultz et al., 2000;
Pierce et al., 2001).
The purpose of this article is to propose specific cognitive
functions for BAs 9, 10, 46 and 47 that are implicit in the great
majority of studies and that match a long history of pre-existing
ideas on the nature of human thought (Figure 1).
THE ORIGIN OF EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE: THE SOCIAL MIND
Complex social interaction is a hallmark of the human species.
More than any other arena of life, our social interactions
are intimately linked to our emotions, and, as such, inscribe
themselves, almost indelibly, into our episodic and emotional
memories (Kensinger, 2009). Yet many of the vehicles of social
interaction, such as the reading of body language and mimicry,
can be identified in the apes and doubtless characterized the
behavior of the australopithecines and our hominid ancestors
(Snow and Wilson, 1991; Byrne, 1995; Call, 2007; Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2009; Snow, 2014).
In non-human primates, there is an inherent reliance on
social bonding, social ostracization often having catastrophic
consequences (Byrne, 1995). In humans, socially-compromising,
psychiatric conditions such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
provide a poignant reminder of our dependence upon accurately
interpreting and integrating the emotional states of self and
others—an otherwise innately acquired ability that underwrites
all social interactions (Frith, 2003; Blakemore et al., 2004).
Emotional Intelligence and Interpersonal
Communication
Our acute psychological dependence upon social interaction has
led some to consider that all higher brain functions, including
our capacity for abstract reasoning and metacognition, have
evolved solely to service our need for society (Dunbar, 1993;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Frith, 2012; Shea et al., 2014). Yet, in
Piaget’s identification of the sequential development of very
different cognitive stages throughout childhood, the creation of
the fundamental, psychosocial concepts that are the foundations
of emotional intelligence, are confined to early years (Frith and
Wolpert, 2004). It is not until after this preoperational stage
that the remainder of childhood sees the development of forms
of intelligence which are not intrinsically concerned with social
interaction but, instead, are almost exclusively focused upon the
material, abstract or temporal domains of human contemplation
(Piaget and Pomerans, 1969; Piaget et al., 1970, 1973; Snow,
2003, 2009, 2014; see: ‘‘The Origin of Hypotheses: The Abstract
Mind’’ and ‘‘The Origin of Practicality: The Material Mind’’
Sections).
Individuals with ASD have difficulty in reading and
expressing body language and, in severe cases, verbal
language, manifesting in these ways a profound deficit in
their comprehension of others (Frith, 2003). Yet people with
ASD occasionally demonstrate astounding mental abilities in
both practical and abstract domains (Frith, 2003; Mottron et al.,
2013; Treffert, 2014). At the opposite extreme of the cognitive
spectrum are individuals with Williams’ syndrome, whose
behavior and speech are dominated by psychosocial concerns
alongside a low intellectual ability and inherent weaknesses
in visuospatial construction and tool use; deficits that are
thought to reflect abnormalities in the ventral and dorsal streams
(Morris, 2010; O’Hearn et al., 2011) that, as argued elsewhere
in this article, are the defining inputs to BA47 (the material
mind) and BA46 (the abstract mind), respectively. While in
day-to-day life the cognitive stance of a normal person might
most easily be interpreted as ‘‘social’’, the hypersocialibilty
of individuals with Williams syndrome does not overcome
their asocial cognitive disabilities, while the socially-barren,
cognitive extremes seen in ASD, powerfully contests the idea
that emotional intelligence is either consistently dominant or
necessary for survival in the modern world. Indeed, it has been
suggested that ASD represents an extreme of a continuum that
describes the normal male psyche (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Hall
et al., 2012).
Localizing Emotional Intelligence—Early
Studies
In the search for the source of emotional intelligence, early
brain imaging studies soon focused on BA9—an area that
composes the medial PFC (mPFC)—each of these terms being
used by different authors. Activation of BA9 was observed
in response to a host of personal or people-related stimuli,
activities or scenarios, such as tickling, pain, swallowing,
sensing familiar odors, rhyming words, reporting on the
pleasantness vs. unpleasantness of words (McDermott et al.,
1999), judging the recency of conversation (Zorrilla et al.,
1996), the retrieval of autobiographical episodic memories
(Lepage et al., 2000) and the implementation of action
(MacDonald et al., 2000), hearing stories about interpersonal
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FIGURE 1 | The representation of the psychosocial, practical, temporal and abstract domains of cognition within Brodmann’s areas 9, 10, 47 and
46-9/46 (BAs 9, 10, 46-9/46 and 47). The social mind (BA9) receives information from areas of the cortex that enables us to integrate facial expressions, gaze and
body language of other agents with our own emotions. The ventral stream delivers information to the material mind (BA47) and the anterior part of Broca’s area
(BA45) from cortical areas that enable us to perceive the identity of objects and people. In contrast, the dorsal stream delivers information about the space and time
to the abstract mind (BA46-9/46) that is not perceptual in nature (Milner and Goodale, 2008, p. 775). In order to accommodate this perceptually-barren information
from the intangible phenomena of space and time, it is proposed that the circuitry within BA46-BA9/46 reorganizes enabling it to embody the necessarily
incongruent inputs from the social (BA9), material (BA47) and temporal (BA10) domains of cognition into hypothetical concepts that characterize Piaget’s Formal
Operations stage of cognitive development (see: Figure 2). The temporal mind (BA10) engages the psychosocial, practical or abstract domains of cognition in the
specific cognitive processes involved in planning. Note that both Broca’s area and BA47 participate in both gestural and verbal communication indicating that the
evolution of language is intimately linked to practicality. Note also the interaction (red star) of the material mind (BA47) with the orbital cortex (BA11) that underlies the
autonomic arousal (negative reinforcement) which results, specifically, from lying about concrete facts.
relationships, recalling or seeing film clips that portray the
experiences of happiness, sadness or disgust (Fletcher et al.,
1995; Lane et al., 1997a; Shallice, 2001; MacLean, 2016),
seeing pictures of unpleasant themes such as frightened
animals, mutilated bodies or human violence, or pictures
of pleasant themes such as erotica, babies or sports events
(Lane et al., 1997b) and performing Theory of Mind tasks
(Goel et al., 1995). Conversely, emotionally neutral pictures
showing inanimate objects, people with neutral facial expressions
or complex scenes or patterns failed to activate BA9 (Lane
et al., 1997b). Finally, there was abnormally low activation of
BA9 in subjects with autism or Asperger’s syndrome (Happe
et al., 1996; Ohnishi et al., 2000). The involvement of BA9
in emotional intelligence is also indicated by the findings
that it is histologically abnormal in schizophrenics (Selemon
et al., 1995; Guillozet-Bongaarts et al., 2014)—a condition that
compromises a person’s ability to comprehend the intentions
of others (Frith and Frith, 1999). When brain imaging of
schizophrenics was performed during Theory of Mind tests,
emotion processing and the judging of agency, there was, as
in autism and Asperger’s syndrome, a reduced recruitment
of BA9 (Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006; Dodell-Feder et al.,
2014).
Emotional Intelligence and the Social Brain
Psychologists and more recently neuroscientists have postulated
the existence of the social brain; a network of interconnected
neural centers devoted to maintaining our community with our
fellow beings (Dunbar, 1993; Frith, 2007; Blakemore, 2008).
Consequently, modern brain imaging studies have focused
on identifying functional networks of specific areas that are
activated by psychosocial challenge and therefore qualify as
part of the social brain. These studies have revealed functional
connections (as distinct from anatomical connections) between
specific areas in both the prefrontal and post-prefrontal areas
of the cortex—areas that are coactivated in socially relevant
tasks ranging from simply identifying facial expressions to
transiently representing the intentions of others (Van Overwalle,
2009, 2011; Koban and Pourtois, 2014; Li et al., 2014).
When, however, the prefrontal lobes are excised from the
mature brain, only the post-prefrontal elements of the social
brain remain, areas that presumably enable the survival of
behavioral phenomena such as mimicry, face recognition and
coordinated movement, alongside the virtual annihilation of the
ability to conceptualize and reason—an observation emphasizing
that the neural circuitry underlying all forms of significant
mental activity is located within the PFC (MacLean, 1990).
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FIGURE 2 | The construction of abstract intelligence and the origins of metacognition. Illustration showing how the social, temporal and material domains of
cognition (BA9, 10 and 47) form lower-order concepts (see: Social EI, Concepts 1–4; Practical PI Concepts 1–4; Temporal TI, Concepts 1–4) from our perceptions of
the world around us. These concepts are lower-order because they are derived from the realities in the psychosocial, temporal and physical realms of existence
(ellipses). The abstract mind (BA46-9/46) creates higher-order concepts or “metaconcepts” (α, β and γ) from a synthesis of the conceptual products of the social,
temporal and material domains of thought. In this way the abstract mind essentially thinks about the cognitive products of the other three environmentally-linked
domains of cognition, thereby creating the almost exclusively human faculty of metacognition.
With respect to emotional intelligence, Van Overwalle (2009)
concludes that when a task requires the preservation in WM
of more enduring elements of human interaction, such as the
emotional disposition of self and others, there is a consistent
participation of the mPFC. It follows that the social brain
must constitute a network of post-prefrontal centers that pass
on highly integrated information to a unique, functional and
structural entity within the PFC that supports the algorithms
of emotional intelligence (Gardner, 1993; Goleman, 1995,
2007).
With respect to the concept of a social brain, brain imaging
has shown that a large number of prefrontal and post-prefrontal
areas may participate in social interactions. Post-prefrontal sites
include superior temporal sulcus (STS, biodynamic imagery),
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ, inferring goals of others),
inferior parietal lobule (IPL, inferring motor intentions of
others), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC, explicit and implicit
emotional engagement), anterior insula (AI, receives visceral
afferents, emotional awareness), fusiform face area (FFA, sense
of agency), orbital frontal cortex (OFC, prediction of reward or
punishment) and the amygdala (elaboration of fear or aggression;
Van Overwalle, 2009; Gu et al., 2013; Koban and Pourtois, 2014;
Li et al., 2014). Prefrontal sites include the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC; BAs 24, 32, 33, representation of emotional states),
mPFC (or BA9, enduring psychosocial concepts) and the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG or BA47, referred to by some authors as
the ventrolateral PFC [VLPFC]; see: ‘‘The Origin of Practicality:
The Material Mind’’ Section). Given its role in practicality, the
recruitment of BA47 in the meeting of particular psychosocial
challenges is at first puzzling. However, examination of the
specific experimental paradigms used in these cases always
reveals a requirement for concrete or physical identification.
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For example, when subjects viewed pictures of human suffering
the mPFC (BA9) was activated, while viewing pictures of dog
suffering activated the IFG (BA47), indicating that, in the latter
case, subjects made a practical, objective, semantic evaluation
rather than one involving psychosocial issues (Franklin et al.,
2013). Similarly, when males and females make social decisions
from faces, the IFG participates more strongly in males, an
effect that is even more exaggerated in ASD wherein the utility
and functional identity of others far outweighs their emotional
significance or their social identity (Hall et al., 2012). On these
arguments and those made elsewhere in this article (see: ‘‘The
Origin of Practicality: The Material Mind’’ Section), caution
should be taken before including the IFG (BA47) in propositions
regarding a social brain network.
Differentiating Cognition from Perception
in the Social Brain
In his detailed meta-analysis of social cognition, Van Overwalle
(2009) states that ‘‘. . . the conclusion that enduring trait
and norm inferences crucially involve the mPFC seems
overwhelmingly supported by the empirical data, whereas
the TPJ seems additionally engaged for processing visual
material about others. This provides support for the view that
the understanding of humans as enduring organisms with
permanent social and psychological properties such as traits and
norms is a crucial common element that engages the mPFC’’
(Van Overwalle, 2009, pp. 847–848). Unfortunately, for the
present case, Van Overwalle chose to consider the ACC and
BA9 as a single functional entity for which he uses the term
mPFC. It is therefore not possible to use his data to better
localize psychosocial cognition to either of these two prefrontal
areas. He does, however, comment that, ‘‘Other general-purpose
functions engage areas of the PFC that are not activated during
social cognition, and are therefore very unlikely to constitute a
core process of social inference, contrary to ideas put forward
by many authors in the social neuroscience literature. . . and
social psychology. . . ’’ (Van Overwalle, 2009; p. 850), thus
making an important point regarding the localization of different
domains of cognition in other parts of the PFC (Barrett et al.,
2007).
In a recent review, Koban and Pourtois (2014, p. 5) state that
‘‘. . .evidence indicating that dorsal ACC, or, more broadly, the
dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC), is involved in both cognitive
and emotional processing. . .and could therefore constitute an
important hub for emotion–cognition interactions’’. Again,
however, this statement does not differentiate between the
ACC and BA9 with respect to a role in cognition. Most sub-
primate mammals have a relatively minute PFC composed
largely of cortex that is functionally homologous to the orbital
and cingulate cortex of primates (Uylings and van Eden, 1990;
Snow et al., 1992; Uylings et al., 2003; Bush and Allman,
2004; Snow, 2009, 2014; Van De Werd et al., 2010; Kaas,
2013). With little if any cortex to spare for cognition, the
behavior of non-primate mammals must be wholly dependent
upon an integration of instinctual drives (raw emotions) with
memory traces (emotional memories) archived in the ACC,
amygdala and the orbital cortex (MacLean, 1990; Snow, 2009,
2014). There can be little doubt that the absence of appreciable
amounts of PFC accounts for why it has been so difficult to
prove the existence of cognitively organized, strategically-based
behavior in non-primate mammals (Byrne, 1995; Mulcahy and
Call, 2006; Suddendorf, 2006; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007;
Osvath, 2009; Merritt et al., 2010; MacLean, 2016). The apparent
sophistication of the ACC in humans, most likely reflects our
pre-primate origins when, in the absence of significant amounts
of cortex devoted to cognition, the ACC would have constituted
the highest, ‘‘executive’’ level of the central nervous system
(MacLean, 1990). However, rather than a cognitive center in
its own right, it is more likely that the ACC of the human
brain acts as an, albeit sophisticated, executive station for
the representation of distinct classes of emotions rather than
participating directly in the processes of thought (Snow, 2009,
2014). Indeed, the neurological report of a patient who recovered
from a state of akinetic mutism precipitated by a temporary
loss of function in her ACC did not indicate a loss of cognitive
ability but, instead, that she comprehended (was cognitively
aware of) what was said to her but suffered a total loss of
motivation required to take action (Damasio and van Hoesen,
1983).
In their review of functional networks involved in social
understanding, Li et al. (2014) consider the ACC and mPFC
as separate functional entities, such that their term, mPFC,
can only be spatially and functionally synonymous with BA9.
Thus, with respect to the function of BA9, they conclude
that, ‘‘Common results show that the MPFC plays a key role
in the social understanding of others, and the subregions
of the MPFC contribute differently to this function. . .[thus]
the ventral MPFC. . .and its connections with emotion regions
are mainly associated with emotion engagement during social
interactions. . .[while]. . .the anterior MPFC (aMPFC). . .and
its connections with posterior and ACC contribute mostly
to making self-other distinctions. . .[and]. . .the dorsal MPFC
(dMPFC). . .and its connection with the TPJ are primarily related
to the understanding of other’s mental states’’ (Li et al., 2014, p.
1). As these conclusions are not related to ACC but specifically to
BA9, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is a functional
subdivision of labor within BA9 that embraces three different
subcategories of psychosocial cognition. Restated in terms of
BA9, these are: (a) the dorsal part of BA9 (dBA9) supports an
understanding of the mental states of others or Theory of Mind
processes; (b) the anterior part of BA9 (aBA9) interacts with
the ACC and the PCC in making self-vs.-other distinctions; and
(c) the ventral part of BA9 (vBA9) participates in emotional
engagement during social interactions or, more specifically,
controlled, cognitively-evoked empathy (Snow, 2009, 2014).
While it is clear that the processes of psychosocial cognition
must draw upon an ensemble of complex perceptions, such as
the emotional status of the host and the emotional readings of
other agents, the analysis of Li et al. (2014) provides powerful
evidence that the cognitive element within our social brain’s
network is BA9 an area that supports ‘‘reasoning about the
thoughts and intentions of conspecifics’’ (MacLean, 2016, p.
6917).
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I therefore propose that, as BA9 constitutes a unique,
anatomically-distinct element of human cognition that engages
the psychosocial domain of life, it be known as the social mind,
an organ of the brain that is responsible for our emotional
intelligence (Figure 1).
THE ORIGIN OF PRACTICALITY: THE
MATERIAL MIND
Our virtually unique ability to name, categorize and classify
thousands of objects and to use them to construct a vast
array of new objects has led some to suggest that, rather than
Homo sapiens, man the knower, a more apt name for our
species might be Homo faber or man the maker (Huizinga,
1970). Until recently, the ability to fashion simple, oldowan
tools was believed to have first appeared in Homo habilis (man
the able), which is also the first hominid generally considered
to be capable of verbal communication (Leakey et al., 1964).
However, it has been shown that the metacarpals of the hand
of Australopithecus africanus enable the forceful opposition
of the thumb and fingers which is considered important for
the construction of tools (Skinner et al., 2015) and in accord
with this, crude stone tools have been discovered that were
constructed 3.3 million years ago or 700,000–800,000 years
before the oldest remains of H. habilis (Harmand et al.,
2015).
Practical Intelligence and The Evolution of
Language
The evolution of language is often considered to be a
consequence of our dependence on a complex social structure
(Valsiner and Veer, 2000; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007; Lee,
2009). However, without speech, apes use body language,
gesturing, facial expressions and relatively crude vocalizations to
successfully maintain a complex social organization (Lieberman,
1986; Byrne, 1995; McGrew, 2004; de Waal, 2006; Pollick and
de Waal, 2007; Waal, 2007). As it is also well established that
the majority of interpersonal communication between humans
is dependent on body language and facial expressions (Pinker,
1994), it again seems reasonable to conclude that the selective
advantage offered by verbal communication is related in only
a minor way to the dependence of Homo sapiens or our
hominid or pre-hominid relatives, on a complex social structure.
Instead, it is more likely that language played a significant
role in the transmission of knowledge that underpinned the
ever-advancing stone tool industry, that is considered to reflect
the progressive intellectual ascendency of the our hominid
ancestors.
There is now considerable evidence that the evolution
of verbal communication was brought about by the need
of our hominid ancestors to accurately convey information
about practical matters (King et al., 2011). Neuroscientific
evidence that communication and practicality have a common
phylogenetic origin is apparent from studies in the macaque
monkey, which have shown that the prelinguistic precursor
of Broca’s area (BA45/44) participates in both gesturing and
manual tasks that are unrelated to communication (Greenfield,
1991; Arbib, 2005; Petrides, 2006; Petrides and Pandya,
2009; Yeterian et al., 2012). In humans, Broca’s area (BA
45/44) participates in the integration of speech and gesturing
(Skipper et al., 2007; Gentilucci and Dalla Volta, 2008; Flinker
et al., 2015) while both Broca’s area and its contralateral
homolog are involved in hand-object interactions including
tool usage (Schendan and Stern, 2007; Higuchi et al., 2009;
Stout and Chaminade, 2012). Despite the imitative capacity
of apes and humans (Byrne, 1995; Frith and Wolpert, 2004),
the ability to accurately communicate factual knowledge
and to physically manipulate objects together have a far
greater potential for survival than either attribute operating
in the absence of the other—again emphasizing the relative
independence of language from selective pressures relating to
the maintenance of a complex social structure in our hominid
ancestors.
The Integration of Practicality and
Language
In each hemisphere, BA45 and BA44, together with the
immediately-adjacent, anteriorly-placed BA47, compose the IFG.
As a consequence of its proximity to BA45, many reviews
of neuroimaging studies of language have implicated BA47 of
the left hemisphere in the production of speech (Bookheimer,
2002; Schmidt and Seger, 2009; Bohrn et al., 2012; Rapp et al.,
2012). Numerous other neuroimaging studies have, however,
focused on the role of the left BA47 in the comprehension of
objects which is a necessary prerequisite for their implementation
in the manufacture of tools and all forms of construction
(Ungerleider et al., 1998; Royet et al., 1999; Adams and Janata,
2002; Plailly et al., 2007; Renier et al., 2009; Garcin et al.,
2012; Kjelvik et al., 2012). It follows that, if language and
practicality share a common phylogenetic origin, then it may
well be that the expansion of BA47 was the critical process in
hominid evolution that united these vital elements of human
aptitude.
Given the contiguity of Broca’s Area and BA47, it is
not surprising that many studies of the IFG have focused
on its potential role in the mechanism of language, thus
limiting the possibility of establishing a potentially more
fundamental role for this area. In a recent meta-analysis, Rapp
et al. (2012) concluded that the anterior part of the left
IFG (BA47/45) engages in the semantic processing or, more
specifically, the integration of words into meaningful sentences
(Bookheimer, 2002; Badre and Wagner, 2007; Menenti et al.,
2009; Friederici, 2012; Rapp et al., 2012). In a second meta-
analysis, Bohrn et al. (2012) report that when subjects attempt
to comprehend non-literal, figurative language, nearly all studies
report activation of the left IFG.When, however, subjects attempt
to comprehend metaphors, the left IFG is activated in response
to conventional metaphors, while the right IFG only participates
in deciphering unconventional or novel metaphors (Bohrn et al.,
2012).
In a study that specifically examined metaphor processing,
Schmidt and Seger (2009) reported activation of the left anterior
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 October 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 501
Snow Organization of Cognition
IFG (left BA47) when subjects encountered familiar metaphors
and activation of the right anterior IFG (right BA47) in response
to unfamiliar metaphors (Schmidt and Seger, 2009). To explain
this asymmetry the authors call upon the ‘‘broader concept of
salience’’, hypothesizing that the right hemisphere is required
for integration of words with less salient (less obvious) meanings
(Giora, 1997, 1999, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2007).
In relation to this issue, it is important to appreciate that, in
the context of our verbal language, salience (the most noticeable
or important) is intimately bound to semantics (meaning in
language or logic). On the other hand, in the context of the
prelinguistic gesturing of our primate relatives (both apes and
monkeys), salience is intimately bound to semiotics, the study of
signs and symbols and their uses, meanings and interpretations
(Stevenson and Oxford University, 2010)—a relationship that
again highlights the inherent link between communication and
our ability to conceptualize form and function that enables us to
so effectivelymeet the practical challenges ever present within the
material domain of human existence.
Rather than salience, however, success in naming objects
appears to be determined more by a subject’s mental focus
upon an object and its position in space (Einhäuser et al.,
2008). Activation of BA47 in humans might therefore be
indicative of its capacity to direct our attention to specific
objects in accordance with their mentally conceived usefulness
in either construction or communication (Roland and Gulyás,
1995; Facchini, 2000; Sakai et al., 2002; Curtis and D’Esposito,
2003; Schendan and Stern, 2007). In terms of the maturation
of BA47 and the relationship between language and our
practical aptitudes, it is relevant that the ability to comprehend
and manipulate codes and anagrams while simultaneously
becoming cognizant of the properties (parametric and
symbolic) of objects and the rules that govern their use
develops between the ages of 7–11 years, a period that
constitutes Piaget’s concrete operational stage of cognitive
development (Piaget and Pomerans, 1969; Piaget et al., 1970,
1973).
Practicality and The Analysis of The
Material World
From neurophysiological and early neuroimaging studies,
Ungerleider et al. (1998; p. 882) concluded that ‘‘object WM
in humans and monkeys are similarly located in VL PFC
[IFG]’’. The physical details of objects and their relative
positions are conveyed to BAs 47, 45 and 44 via the ventral
stream (Petrides and Pandya, 2002, 1999)—the ‘‘what’’ pathway
of Goodale et al. (1991) and Goodale and Milner (1992).
The IFG has also been implicated in the maintenance of
information relating to objects (Courtney et al., 1998; Munk
et al., 2002; Sala and Courtney, 2007), including their color
(Elliott and Dolan, 1998; Mohr et al., 2003, 2006; Yee
et al., 2003) and sound (Rama et al., 2004). Moreover, much
neuroimaging work has shown that objects identified as familiar
on the basis of vision, touch and hearing activate the IFG
(Ungerleider et al., 1998; Adams and Janata, 2002; Renier
et al., 2009) and are functionally categorized within the left
BA47 (Garcin et al., 2012). Indeed, the IFG also participates
in the olfactory identification of objects (Plailly et al., 2007;
Kjelvik et al., 2012) with BA47 of the left hemisphere showing
activation to the odor of familiar objects (Kjelvik et al.,
2012).
Activation of BA47 and BA45 accompanies subjects making
decisions about how to categorize objects. However, if they
are asked to mentally rotate objects there is activation of both
BA47 and BA46 but not BA45 (Roland and Gulyás, 1995;
Schendan and Stern, 2007). In a departure from language-
orientated protocols and the issue of familiarity, Garcin et al.
(2012) have recently tested the involvement of the IFG in
assessing the similarity of objects, stating that, ‘‘the neural
basis of similarity detection [of objects] has never been studied
because the hypothesis that specific areas are involved in
such processing has not yet been formulated’’ (Garcin et al.,
2012, p. 7). In their study, activation of the anterior IFG was
measured while subjects were asked to associate one of the
two drawings of objects with a drawing of a target object. In
each trial, two forms of association were possible, one requiring
the subject to seek similarity or difference in relation to a
concrete, physical element, such as shape and the other requiring
subjects to seek, what Garcin et al. (2012) refer to as similarity
or difference in relation to category—this latter task requiring
the divination of a thematic or functional link between two
objects.
Garcin et al. (2012) report that while the anterior IFG in
both left and right hemispheres was activated by comparisons of
shape only the left anterior IFG was activated by comparisons
of functional or thematic categories. These authors also
cite neurological video evidence that patients with prefrontal
damage have difficulty in comprehending similarities between
objects in categorization tasks. It is important to note that
Garcin et al. (2012) emphasize that, when their subjects
were mentally focused on objects, it was the anterior part
of both left and right IFG that was activated, which, in
cytoarchitectonic terms, corresponds to BA47 and not Broca’s
area (BA45/44) or its contralateral homolog. Moreover, in
relation to the role of BA47 in contemplation of the material
world, Garcin et al. (2012) conclude that the participation of
the anterior IFG in ‘‘similarity detection may depend on more
elementary sub-processes such as maintaining the intention
to search for identity, building mental representations of
abstract and/or concrete features for all items’’ (Garcin et al.,
2012, p. 7).
Practicality in Construction and Symbolism
In their review, Courtney et al. (1998) found that activation of
the left IFG reflects analytical processing of visually presented
objects, while activation of the right IFG is involved in
processing image-based, iconic features of faces and objects.
Since then, Vignal et al. (2000) have shown that electrical
stimulation of the right IFG caused subjects to experience a
rapid succession of faces (Vignal et al., 2000), while Downar
et al. (2002) have demonstrated activation of BA47 of the
right hemisphere occurs in accord with the novelty value
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of objects (Downar et al., 2002). These results approximate
those of Garcin et al. (2012) in that they implicate the left
IFG in the comprehension of the parametric properties of
objects that are essential in defining both their similarity
and their usefulness, while the right IFG attends to the
shape of objects in relation to their iconographic or symbolic
significance.
With respect to the interpretation of language, these studies
accord not only with the classical dichotomy of hemispheric
function (Springer and Deutsch, 1997) but also with the finding
that BA47 in the right hemisphere is selectively employed in
the complex semantic task of deciphering unconventional or
unfamiliar metaphors (Schmidt and Seger, 2009; Bohrn et al.,
2012)—metaphors that are often used when we attempt to
verbally describe the symbolic and iconographic significance of
certain classes of objects or unfamiliar, yet clearly symbolic,
characters.
Rules, Syllogisms and Practicality
A number of neuroimaging studies have implicated the IFG
in the maintenance of task rules (Bunge et al., 2003; Sakai
and Passingham, 2003, 2006; Bunge, 2004; Rowe et al., 2007;
Bengtsson et al., 2009; Bode and Haynes, 2009). More recently,
Reverberi et al. (2012c) have shown that, when subjects were
asked to retrieve, maintain and apply sets of conditional rules
to different target stimuli, BA47 in the right PFC participated
in identifying the rule (Reverberi et al., 2012c). In a second
study where subjects were asked to remember and apply either
simple or compound rules, BA47 of the right hemisphere was
implicated in both the representation of compound rules and
the decoding of them from information extracted from single
rules (Reverberi et al., 2012b). In contrast, BA47 in the left
PFC has been shown to participate in the search for logically
valid solutions to problems, the formal structure of which
is represented within Broca’s area (BA45/44; Reverberi et al.,
2012a).
Reverberi et al. (2012a) conclude that BA47 is involved in
the ‘‘. . .selection and application of inferential rules’’ (Reverberi
et al., 2012a, p. 1752), asserting, however, that its participation
in the underlying deductive reasoning is dependent upon its
interactions with other brain areas, specifically Broca’s area,
the premotor cortex (BA6), the frontal eye fields (BA8) and
the tertiary visual association cortex (V3 or BA19). While co-
activation of neural centers is expected in behaving human
subjects, the location of BA47 squarely within the networks of the
PFC (Kelly et al., 2010; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2012; Yeterian
et al., 2012) makes it reasonable to conclude that BA47 is the
cognitive center of syllogistic deduction and is thus fundamental
to the creation of rules applicable to our physical surroundings
and their formulation into language.
Practicality and the Definition of Lying
In the accurate communication of our physical reality, both
observation and the selection of correct words are essential.
Indeed in many circumstances that relate to our material
surroundings miscommunication, errant observation or lying
can be fatal. In contrast, the outcome of the truthful
communication of either our psychosocial issues or our
hypothetical beliefs is far less predictable and, in most cases, has
so little bearing on survival that, for the sake of tact alone, we
often intentionally avoid honesty in these particular cognitive
domains.
Although, in themodern world, much factual communication
is of little relevance to our survival, this would not have been
the case for our socially-enabled hominid ancestors, who were
seriously challenged with surviving the intense selective pressure
of direct exposure to an often hostile environment. Under such
conditions, any neural systems that would ensure the validity
of factual communication would be of great selective advantage.
Particularly in our hominid relatives, neither the communication
of the hypothetical nor their prevailing moods would have
matched the importance of the accurate conveyance of practical
information about their environment or the participation of their
cohorts in practical tasks.
The involvement of BA47 in so many matters that require
accurate definition and logic suggests that, more than any other
area of the brain, BA47 requires constraints that ensure the
validity of communication. This is supported by the finding that
BA47 is powerfully implicated in the definition of truth and
validity. For example, neuroimaging studies of subjects telling
spontaneous, isolated lies produced right hemisphere activation
in both BA47 and BA11 of the lateral orbital cortex (Spence et al.,
2004), an area known to be involved in the prediction of negative
outcomes (punishment; Snow, 2003, 2009, 2014; Ressler, 2010;
Sescousse et al., 2010). When, however, subjects consider their
response to a question that allowed deception, the right BA47
was activated without activation of BA11 (Sip et al., 2012). In
yet another paradigm, when subjects make false, compared to
true, claims, the right IFG and amygdala were activated (Sip et al.,
2013).
Anatomically, BA47 is dorsolaterally adjacent to, and
interconnected with, BA11 (Kelly et al., 2010; Thiebaut de
Schotten et al., 2012; Yeterian et al., 2012). In their study of
logical reasoning, Reverberi et al. (2012a) have commented that
BA47 is distinct from all other brain regions in its adherence
to the principle of validity. In risk-taking behavior which lacks
the assurance of either physical reality or syllogistic deduction,
BA47 and BA11 of the right hemisphere are activated (Critchley
et al., 2000b). The co-activation of BA11 with BA47 therefore
represents a critical constraint experienced as a centrally-created
negative reinforcement of lying that ensures sympathetic arousal
specifically when concrete truths seated in the physical reality of
our immediate environment are contravened (Snow, 2003, 2009,
2014).
This phylogenetic perspective and the role of BA47 in
semantic processing, similarity detection, salience, semiotics,
gesturing, familiarity, the comprehension of metaphors, the
selection of inferential rules, syllogistic deductions and the
identification of objects and the representation of their
parametric and iconographic functionality, indicates that BA47
acts as a mental platform responsible for the elaboration and
communication of human practicality. I propose, therefore, that,
as BA47 constitutes a unique, anatomically-distinct element of
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human cognition, it be known as the material mind, an organ
of the brain that is responsible for our high degree of practical
intelligence (Figure 1).
THE ORIGIN OF THE FUTURE: THE
TEMPORAL MIND
The loss of both the ability to plan and the ability to conceptualize
the future are conspicuous consequences of prefrontal lobotomy
(MacLean, 1990). More than any other single factor, planning
involves a registration of the passage of time, for in many real
life circumstances, time is the essence of survival (Piaget and
Pomerans, 1969; Allen et al., 1991; Benson, 1997). In their review
of time models and cognitive processes in robotic behavior,
Maniadakis and Trahanias (2014) emphasize the need for a
component that enables ‘‘the multimodal interaction between
sense of time and cognition that goes far beyond the perception
of duration, addressing a very broad range of cognitive functions.
This suggests temporal cognition as the cognitive glue that
enables the integration of skills into a coherent smoothly
functioning composite system’’ (Maniadakis and Trahanias,
2014, p. 4).
The Nature of Planning
When challenged with a complex goal, our cognitive centers
automatically divide the task into a temporally-ordered series
of smaller tasks or sub-goals that must be performed in the
correct sequence in order to attain success. Plans differ from
other elements of cognition in that they are never of the moment,
but instead can only be actualized in the future and so must be
preserved in memory. Planning is the basis of proactivity and as
such, it demands the integration of time, both past (reflective)
and future (prospective). It follows, that in order to orchestrate
the steps of any plan, a neural center must be able to preserve
the plan in what is almost universally referred to as prospective
memory (Okuda et al., 1998; Koechlin et al., 1999, 2000; Burgess
et al., 2001). If we consider that many human plans extend over
days, weeks and months, then our ability to plan is indicative of
a neural platform that enables us to meaningfully conceptualize
the future—a process that inevitably draws upon our (episodic)
memories of those past events that are germane to the success
or failure of our current goals. Notwithstanding the retrospective
nature of memory, the essential steps of planning are firmly
directed towards the future and the necessity to remember a
plan has therefore been referred to as a ‘‘memory of the future’’
(Ingvar, 1985). It is this ‘‘memory of the future’’ that is lost when
the prefrontal lobes are disconnected from the rest of the brain
(MacLean, 1990) or even when damage is confined to BA10
on the frontopolar surface of the prefrontal lobes (Roca et al.,
2011).
Localization and Activation of Temporal
Intelligence
It has been widely recognized that while patients with lesions of
the most rostral part of the PFC (BA10) remain cognizant of the
contextual information that they would need to plan a sequence
of actions, they consistently fail to appreciate the importance
of temporally organizing their own actions in order to achieve
any given objective (Grafman et al., 1993; Sirigu et al., 1995;
Loarer et al., 1998; Swain et al., 1998; Burgess, 2000; Roca et al.,
2011; Volle et al., 2011). The specific source of these deficits
became clear when early neuroimaging studies implicated BA10
in the organization and registration of each sub-goal of a task
(Baker et al., 1996; Owen et al., 1996; Koechlin et al., 1999,
2000; Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002) and the retention of both
the status of each sub-goal and the overall plan in prospective
memory (Pochon et al., 2002). Thus, Koechlin et al. (1999, p. 148)
have stated, ‘‘bilateral regions in the frontopolar PFC (FPPC
or BA10) alone are selectively activated when subjects have to
keep in mind a main goal while performing concurrent (sub)
goals. Neither keeping in mind a goal over time (WM) nor
successively allocating attentional resources between alternative
goals (dual-task performance) could by themselves activate these
regions.’’
When experimental designs have specifically targeted the
elements required for planning, BA10 is repeatedly found to
play a complex yet critical role in this essential human activity.
Thus the rostral PFC (rPFC or frontopolar cortex, FPC) has
been implicated in thinking about the future (Okuda et al.,
2003), multitasking, episodic memory retrieval (Gilbert et al.,
2006), thinking about intentions (den Ouden et al., 2005),
relational reasoning, characterized by the need to consider
many relations simultaneously (Christoff et al., 2001, 2003;
Kroger et al., 2002; Tsujimoto et al., 2011), the simultaneous
pursuance of two independent goals (Charron and Koechlin,
2010), encoding goals (Genovesio et al., 2012), lower-order rule
switching (Yoshida et al., 2010), switching tasks (Dumontheil
et al., 2010a), keeping ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘when’’ intentions in
mind (Momennejad and Haynes, 2012), prospective visual-
spatial memory (Costa et al., 2013), sustaining prospective,
but not working, memory (Okuda et al., 2007; Reynolds and
O’Reilly, 2009; Burgess et al., 2011), control of cognitive
branching in the allocation of attention between two tasks
(Koechlin et al., 2000; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007), multitasking
resulting from prospective memory of deferred goals (Koechlin
et al., 1999; Burgess, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008; Burgess
et al., 2009), switching of behavior in the exploration and
exploitation of prevailing circumstances (Boorman et al., 2009),
establishing task sets (Sakai, 2008), attentional sets (Pollmann,
2004) and cognitive, context-dependent sets (Rowe et al.,
2007; Benoit, 2008) and the following of rules (Crescentini
et al., 2011). While a few of these essentially operational
terms do not specifically refer to planning, all describe
elementary processes that can be easily identified as necessary
components for the formation, maintenance and execution of a
plan.
The role of BA10 in planning is further emphasized in
the conclusions of many authors. For example, the role
of the rPFC has been described as, ‘‘essential to support
functional connectivity among task-related regions’’ (Rowe et al.,
2007), providing ‘‘contingent interposition of two concurrent
behavioral plans or mental tasks’’ (Koechlin and Hyafil,
2007), engaging in ‘‘self-generated thoughts’’ and ‘‘spontaneous
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thoughts’’ (Dumontheil et al., 2010b), ‘‘episodic prospection’’
and ‘‘autobiographical memories’’ (Benoit et al., 2010), ‘‘fluid
intelligence’’ and ‘‘prospective imagination’’ (Roca et al., 2010;
Burgess et al., 2011), participating in a ‘‘rostrocaudal hierarchy’’
(Badre and D’Esposito, 2009; Colombo et al., 2015), acting
as a ‘‘multiple demand’’ center that monitors the content
of cognitive operations, directing mental focus to produce
a robust separation of the component sub-goals required
for successful completion of a task (Duncan, 2013) and
seemingly in deference to the multidomanial complexity of
both planning and relative size of BA10, representing ‘‘the
highest levels of human cognition’’ (Burgess et al., 2007a).
Again, each of these terms and phrases either directly
implicate BA10 in planning or they allude to its extraordinary
organizational power in orchestrating our behavior around our
intentions.
Temporal Intelligence and the Subdivision
of Labor
Since these early studies, many investigations have attempted
to detect a subdivision of labor within BA10 that might reveal
how this area participates in planning. Using regional cerebral
blood flow, Burgess et al. (2003) were able to show that the lateral
portion of BA10 became activated in paradigms that required
cognitive maintenance (or a prospective memory) of a plan
while the superior medial portion of BA10 was either unaffected
or showed a decreased level of activity over its resting state
(Burgess et al., 2003). These results have since been confirmed
and extended in a number of studies (Simons et al., 2006;
Rowe et al., 2007; Benoit et al., 2012) which have shown that
while activation of the cytoarchitectonically-identifiable, lateral
portion of BA10 (lateral rPFC, lrPFC) relates to the subject
attempting to keep in mind the requirements for completing a
given task, the cytoarchitectonically-identifiable superior medial
portion of BA10 (medial rPFC, mrPFC) remains responsive to
other, unrelated yet ongoing, environmental information. In
what has been called the Gateway Hypothesis, Burgess et al.
(2007a,b) have proposed what is essentially reciprocal inhibition
between the lateral part of BA10 that is responsible maintaining
those thoughts related to achieving the current goal (referred
to as ‘‘internal thought processes’’) and the medial part of
BA10 that is responsible for directing our attention to external
events (Burgess et al., 2007a,b). In terms of survival, such a
system would ensure that when we are suddenly under threat
from some novel environmental source, our attention would be
directed away from the otherwise blind pursuit of our immediate
plan.
The Adaptive Value and Evolution of
Temporal Intelligence
In humans, BA10 is larger than any other area of Brodmann.
Stereological measurements of the volume of BA10 in a single
human hemisphere, showed that it consists of 14.2 mm3 of
gray matter (Semendeferi et al., 2001). When this volume
(14.2 mm3) was expressed as a percentage of the total brain
volume of the same individual, BA10 of one hemisphere
constituted 1.2% of that person’s entire brain. At 2.8 mm3,
the bonobo has the second largest BA10, constituting 0.75%
of its entire brain volume, followed by the chimpanzee (2.3
mm3, 0.57%), the gorilla (1.9 mm3, 0.54%) and the relatively
small-brained Orangutan wherein BA10, although only 1.6
mm3, nevertheless, constitutes 2.87% of its brain volume. While
in apes and humans BA10 covers the frontal pole of each
hemisphere, in the gibbon, a lesser ape, BA10 is confined to
the orbital sector of the frontal lobe and markedly reduced
in both absolute (0.2 mm3) and relative size (0.2% of whole
brain volume; Semendeferi et al., 2001). It has long been
known that the size of BA9 and BA46 varies radically between
different individuals (Rajkowska and Goldman-Rakic, 1995). It
is, therefore, highly likely that the size of BA10 would show
a similar, high degree of inter-individual variation—a wide
spectrum that might well reflect the concomitant variation
in the concern with time and planning, shown by different
individuals and populations (Lippincott and National Maritime,
1999).
In humans, it has been estimated that BA10 contains around
240,000,000 neurons. However, at approximately 34,000/mm3,
the density of neurons in BA10 is substantially less than the mean
of approximately 52,000/mm3 that has been reported for BA46
(Selemon et al., 1995, 1998). Semendeferi et al. (Selemon et al.,
1995) have suggested that BA10 is largely composed of neuropile
which is indicative of its capacity to make an unusually large
number of connections with higher-order association areas—a
view supported by the relatively low density of neurons and their
abnormally extensive dendritic arborizations (Jacobs et al., 2001;
Travis et al., 2005).
In apes, BA10 is many times larger than the area identified as
BA10 in new and old world monkeys (Petrides and Pandya, 1999;
Semendeferi et al., 2001). While some evidence exists that apes
are capable of planning (Mulcahy and Call, 2006), the evidence
thatmonkeys are capable ofmaking plans is controversial (Byrne,
1995; Naqshbandi and Roberts, 2006; Premack, 2007). This
may reflect the fact that cytoarchitectonically, the relatively tiny
BA10 of the monkey resembles the mrPFC in humans and
not the human lrPFC, which has been repeatedly implicated
in retaining task specific information (Carmichael and Price,
1994, 1996; Simons et al., 2006; Rowe et al., 2007; Tsujimoto
et al., 2010, 2011; Benoit et al., 2012). According to Tsujimoto
et al. (2011), neurons in the FPC of the monkey, unlike
neurons elsewhere in its PFC, do not show prospective coding
(the representation of a place or object as a goal). However,
Tsujimoto et al. (2011) go on to propose ‘‘. . . that the FPC
[in the monkey] encodes goals generated by certain cognitive
processes and that it helps link those processes to particular
outcomes. . . On this view, the FPC promotes future prospective
coding elsewhere in the brain without its neurons engaging in
ongoing prospective coding’’ (Tsujimoto et al., 2011, p. 174).
According to this theory, even the relatively small volume of
PFC constituting BA10 in the monkey has an, albeit limited,
capacity to play an integrative rather than an executive role in
the temporal organization of behavior. From their studies of
BA10 in apes and humans, Semendeferi et al. (2001) conclude
that: (a) ‘‘During hominid evolution, area 10 underwent a couple
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of additional changes: one involves a considerable increase
in overall size, and the other involves a specific increase
in connectivity...’’ and (b) that these changes underwrite the
fact that, ‘‘Planning of future actions and the undertaking of
initiatives are hallmarks of human behavior. . . ’’ (Semendeferi
et al., 2001, p. 240).
Temporal Intelligence and the Diversity of
Planning Across Domains
Planning is essential in all domains of human life, including
our endeavors in the social, practical and abstract realms
of existence. However, BA10 has been shown to participate
in a number of experimental paradigms that neither directly
negate nor implicate this area in the orchestration of planning.
Thus, neuroimaging studies have shown activations of BA10
when subjects are making simple decisions (Daw et al.,
2006), considering moral dilemmas (Raichle and Snyder,
2007), improvising music (Limb and Braun, 2008), making
value judgments (Zysset et al., 2002; Lawrence et al., 2009),
‘‘mentalizing’’ (Gilbert et al., 2006; Burgess et al., 2009; Benoit
et al., 2010; Roca et al., 2011) and employing and detecting
deception (Ganis et al., 2003; Karim et al., 2010).
That humans typically make plans in all domains of existence
greatly complicates the interpretation of neuroimaging studies of
planning. This difficulty arises because a human subject cannot
plan without reference to specific entities, be they feelings, objects
or ideas. The humanmind has evolved in situ and, for this reason,
cannot create a plan without making reference to elements of the
plan, irrespective of whether they are the psychosocial, practical
or abstract realms. This not only complicates the interpretation
of neuroimaging studies but it probably explains why studies
of planning in children of different ages are typically plagued
by issues that appear to be related to the stage of cognitive
development of that particular group of children (Friedman and
Scholnick, 1997). Each Piagetian stage of cognitive development
must surely be accompanied by new procedures of planning that
are specifically tailored to the forms of thought that develop in the
preoperational (psychosocial), concrete operational (practical)
and formal operational (hypothetical) periods (Piaget et al.,
1970, 1973). That the rPFC continues to develop throughout
childhood and into adolescence with the rate of development
peaking in late childhood (Sowell et al., 2004; Konrad et al.,
2005; Shaw et al., 2008; Moriguchi and Hiraki, 2011, 2013;
Tanaka et al., 2012; Mills et al., 2014) is indicative of the
need for the algorithms of planning to be adapted and
extended in order to facilitate the sequential maturation of
the psychosocial, practical and abstract domains of human
intelligence.
The essence of all planning is time. Patients with
circumscribed lesions within BA10 of the right rPFC not
only showed a deficit in time-based, prospective memory tasks
(words and pictures) but also were significantly impaired in
the estimation of time (Volle et al., 2011). In contrast, damage
to the dorsolateral convexity (BA9/46) produced a failure to
manipulate information, but did not disrupt that patient’s
ability to estimate time (Ptak and Schnider, 2004). In the
physical domain, where the rules of common-sense logic and
the essentially Newtonian properties of objects and space are
of great importance, chronological time (or objective time) is
critical to the efficiency of completing any task. In contrast,
within the psychosocial domain, the passage psychological time
(subjective time) is far more dependent on our emotions, moods
and the company we are keeping (Droit-Volet, 2012). To create
an efficient plan in the social realm requires a set of algorithms
that incorporate the highly subjective nuances of psychological
time (Craig, 2009; van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2009,
2013). Finally, when it comes to orchestrating and maintaining
the mental focus required to systematically solve abstract
problems, BA10 is activated along with BA46 (Wolf et al., 2010).
For example, when subjects practiced strategic deception in a
two-person bargaining game there was a cooperative activation
of BA10 and BA46 (Bhatt et al., 2010). Given that BA10 is always
activated in planning paradigms, it seems reasonable to conclude
that BA10 is participating in the planning of strategies, the
essence of which are being conducted within BA46, an area that
is activated when there is demand for executive control (Kübler
et al., 2006). The participation of BA46 in tasks that require
intense mental concentration suggests that the passage of time
during ideational planning would be most likely measured by
the level of mental fatigue (Zarahn et al., 2005; Schnell et al.,
2007; see: ‘‘The Origin of Hypotheses: The Abstract Mind’’
Section).
People vary vastly in their concern for the passage of
time and their propensity to engage in planning (Lippincott
and National Maritime, 1999). With less than 1/6 of the
volume of gray matter that composes BA10 in humans, apes
are only capable of making the simplest plans (Byrne, 1995;
Premack, 2007). The massive allocation of cortex to BA10
in the human brain, underscores the absolute dependency
of Homo sapiens on planning in every domain of existence
(Semendeferi et al., 2001), a dependency that can be traced
back 28,000 years to the endeavors of Paleolithic Europeans to
systematically measure calendric time (Eccles, 1989). As BA10
has been consistently shown to: (a) be necessary for planning;
and (b) to be engaged whenever there is a cerebral necessity
to temporally organize behavior, I propose that this unique,
complex and anatomically-distinct element of human cognition
be known as the temporal mind, an organ of the brain that
is responsible for our high degree of temporal intelligence
(Figure 1).
THE ORIGIN OF HYPOTHESES: THE
ABSTRACT MIND
In 1781, the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, published
his Critique of Pure Reason wherein he proposed that our
complex reasoning stemmed from two elements: an a priori or
preexisting element and an a posteriori or experientially acquired
element (Kant et al., 1998). Kant envisaged that this a priori
element did not arise from our worldly experiences but that it
constituted the structural foundation of our capacity to think
at the level of ideas and theories. He further postulated that
this a priori element came into existence to accommodate our
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inevitable encounter with the intangible phenomena of space
and time; asserting that these, essentially invisible properties
of the universe are critical to establishing the substrate upon
which all complex (hypothetical) reasoning is dependent. By
intangible phenomena Kant meant aspects of our environment
that, unlike color, size, form, sound, odor, taste and texture,
we cannot observe directly but which we believe or hypothesize
must exist in order to explain certain aspects of reality. Examples
of other intangible phenomena would be gravitational forces,
the nature of matter, magnetism, consciousness and thought.
As intangible phenomena cannot be perceived, then, as Kant
postulated, they can only ever be the hypothetical products
of an operational system capable of complex reasoning: a
form of reasoning that is fully enabled by end of Piaget’s
formal operational phase of cognitive development around
approximately the age of 15 years (Piaget et al., 1970,
1973).
Neurodevelopmental Plasticity and The
Conceptualization of Space and Time
It is well known that while the development of cortical
cytoarchitecture develops relatively independently of afferent
input (Wise and Jones, 1978; Snow and Wilson, 1991; Woo and
Finlay, 1996), an essential stage in the postnatal development
of the cortex being the reorganization of its neural circuitry in
response to the arrival of afferent projections and the receipt
of the information these afferents deliver from other neural
centers (Snow and Wilson, 1991; Windrem and Finlay, 1991;
Li et al., 2013; Vue et al., 2013). Prior to the maturation
of the ability to entertain hypothesis, time and space are
the only intangible phenomena that can gain entry to the
cortex and so influence the post-natal development of the PFC
(van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2009, 2013). In Piaget’s
words, ‘‘As Kant has shown so clearly, time and space are
not concepts but unique ‘‘schemes’’, there is only one time
and one space in the entire universe’’ (Piaget and Pomerans,
1969, p. 33). It follows that the identity of the cognitive
center responsible for the formation of hypotheses may be
revealed by: (a) its maturation around the end of Piaget’s
formal operations stage of cognitive development (15 years);
and (b) its receipt of powerful afferent inputs that convey
information about space and time devoid of perceptually-
relevant information about the external environment (Milner
and Goodale, 2008). Implicit in the present proposal is the
reasonable assumption that, during early postnatal development,
inputs to this area of cortex will be accommodated by
modifications to its primordial neural circuitry. Much as Kant
reasoned long ago, it is difficult to see how else a cortical
area capable of engaging in hypothetical thought might be
fashioned, other than by being presented, in early development,
by the intangible, perceptually-incongruous aspects of space and
time.
The critical clue to identifying this area can be found in
the organization of the primate visual system (Ungerleider
et al., 1998). In their Figure 1, all the perceptual elements
that compose human vision are accounted for by the specific
visual representations within different post-prefrontal areas. In
addition to these, however, there remain two strong anteriorly-
directed, visual projections, one to BA46 and the other to
BA12 (the homolog of BA47 in humans), prefrontal areas
that have been repeatedly implicated in human cognition.
These two projections are: (a) the ventral stream, which
carries visual and auditory information about the identity
of objects and their spatial relationships, constituting the
‘‘what’’ pathway of Goodale et al. (1991), Goodale and
Milner (1992) and Milner and Goodale (2008), Petrides and
Pandya (1999; 2002; see: ‘‘The Origin of Practicality: The
Material Mind’’ Section); and (b) the dorsal stream which
carries absolute spatial and temporal information in real-time,
constituting the ‘‘where’’ pathway (Goodale et al., 1991). The
information from the ventral stream is delivered to BA47/12
(see: The Origin of Practicality), while the information from
the dorsal stream is delivered to BA46 (Ungerleider et al.,
1998).
In their recent review Milner and Goodale (2008) suggest
that the ventral stream provides ‘‘vision for perception’’ while
the dorsal stream provides ‘‘vision for action’’. The critical
distinction between these pathways is that, while pivotal
in orchestrating behavioral output (movement), information
carried by the dorsal stream does not reach awareness and
therefore, ‘‘is not perceptual in nature’’ (Milner and Goodale,
2008, p. 775). Indeed in relation to the information being
delivered to BA46 along the dorsal stream, they state that
‘‘although we may be conscious of the actions we perform,
the visual information used [by BA46] to program and
control those actions can never be experienced’’ (Milner
and Goodale, 2008, p. 776), citing as supportive evidence
Weiskrantz’s assertion that the dorsal stream participates in
blind sight (Weiskrantz, 1997, p. 138). As all elements of
visual perception, including spatial awareness, are adequately
accounted for by the post-prefrontal visual representations
(Ungerleider et al., 1998), there remains only one possible
role for further integration at the level of the PFC, that
of the conceptualization of information—conceptualization of
form and function in BA47 (see: ‘‘The Origin of Practicality:
The Material Mind’’ Section) and conceptualization of space
and time in BA46. Denied information from the ventral
stream about physical objects, the primordial BA46 must adapt
its circuitry by accommodating the information about time
and space from the dorsal stream that, like all intangible
phenomena, lacks a perceptual reality (van Wassenhove, 2009).
In this process BA46 would necessarily become tuned to
the integration (conceptualization) of any and all intangible
phenomena into abstract concepts, many of which will be
the synchronous, yet dissonant, inputs from the other three
cognitive areas (BAs 9, 10 and 47), each relaying integrated
(conceptualized) information from a distinctly different domain
of life.
In this model, the emergent circuitry within BA46 would be
generically adapted to embrace all perceptual and/or cognitive
incongruences, such as, for example, the existence of magnetic
fields that can only be represented in a unique class of
concepts that are, in essence, cognitively-structured hypotheses
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(Medin et al., 2000). In accordance with Kant’s proposal, the
conceptualization of perceptually-barren information about time
and space would constitute the vital formative process within
BA46, establishing it as the neural center with the capacity to
underwrite our ability to entertain any and all hypotheses; an area
that begins to dominate behavior around the age of 15, enabling
Piaget’s formal operational stage of cognitive development. Of
all areas of the cerebral cortex, only BA46 fulfills these critical
criteria.
Neuroanatomy, Development and
Evolution of Abstract Intelligence
Walker described area 46 in the monkey PFC as flanking the
principal sulcus for almost its entire length (Walker, 1940). In
their seminal revision of the cytoarchitecture of the monkey
and human PFC, Petrides and Pandya (1999) reported that the
caudal moiety of Walker’s area 46 shared some cytoarchitectural
characteristics with area 9. Thus, in both monkey and human
they define area 46 as cortex flanking the anterior part of the
principal sulcus, referring to the cortex flanking the caudal part
as area 9/46 (Petrides and Pandya, 1999; Petrides et al., 2012).
That areas 46 and 9/46 may share considerable homogeneity in
function is indicated by subsequent studies which have shown
powerfully interconnects between these abutting areas on both
sides of the principal sulcus while both areas 46 and 9/46 share
connections to the IPL and to all other areas of Brodmann
within the PFC (Yeterian et al., 2012). Unfortunately, some
brain imaging studies of these regions have not made specific
reference to Brodmann’s areas, opting instead to reference the
location of cortical activity to surface structures of the PFC,
such as the DLPFC or the middle frontal gyrus. Other brain
imaging studies have not attempted to differentiate between
areas 46 and 9/46, referring to area 46 of Walker (Walker,
1940) or the DLPFC, as either BA46 (Koch et al., 2006) or
BA9/46 (Thakral and Slotnick, 2009; Wolf et al., 2010). Thus,
in the following sections, the term BA46-9/46 will be used
to refer to area 46, as defined by Walker, a part of the
dorsolateral convexity that includes both BA46 and BA9/46, as
defined by Petrides and Pandya (1999). It should be cautioned
that this is not intended to mean that BA46 and BA9/46
of Petrides and Pandya (1999) will not eventually be shown
to have distinct functional properties but that the differences
between them are probably not ‘‘dominial’’, such as those that
distinguish the functions of BAs 9, 10 and 47, from each
other.
Phylogenetically, the cortex surrounding the principal sulcus
is considered to be one of the last areas to evolve, being absent
in the primitive primate, the bush baby, Galagos (Preuss and
Goldman-Rakic, 1991). Ontogenetically, the cortex surrounding
the principal sulcus (BA46-9/46) is one of the last areas of
the brain to reach maturity, the structural and functional
differentiation of the dorsolateral convexity, including BA46-
9/46, remaining incomplete until late puberty (Bonin, 1950;
Huttenlocher, 1979; Fuster, 1995; Huttenlocher and Dabholkar,
1997; Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999a,b; Spence et al.,
2004; Diamond, 2000; Giedd, 2004; Lenroot et al., 2009;
Petanjek et al., 2011; Raznahan et al., 2011). However, this does
not mean that these areas are dormant until puberty. Thus,
neurodevelopmental studies show that structural and functional
changes in the DLPFC are ongoing throughout childhood and
are accompanied by the slow but continuous emergence of
executive functions that are typically associated with BA46-
9/46 (Casey et al., 1997, 2000; Sowell et al., 2001; Adleman
et al., 2002; Diamond, 2002; Kwon et al., 2002; Huizinga
et al., 2006; Kübler et al., 2006; Chase et al., 2008; Volle
et al., 2008; Roca et al., 2010; Rosenberg-Lee et al., 2011;
Baron and Leonberger, 2012; Gerbella et al., 2013; Dumontheil,
2014).
Cognitive Challenges and The Activation of
Abstract Intelligence
While it is difficult to demonstrate that monkeys can entertain
hypotheses about intangible phenomena, single unit recordings
in the DLPFC and/or BA46-9/46 have shown this area to
be involved in spatial WM (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 1999),
the generation of behavioral plans (Hoshi and Tanji, 2004),
the monitoring of internal representations to guide behavior
(Petrides, 2000), executive functions and the higher-level
integration of movements (Gerbella et al., 2013), abstract aspects
of conceptual processes (Tanji and Hoshi, 2008), a context-
dependent, flexible behavioral control system (Tsujimoto and
Sawaguchi, 2005) and executive functions and cognitive
performance (Opris et al., 2012; Opris and Casanova, 2014).
Futhermore, the participation of the monkey PFC in cognitive
processes has been further demonstrated by Opris and
Casanova (2014) who have shown that microstimulation in
the infragranular layers, improves performance on delayed
match to sample trials (Opris et al., 2005; Hampson et al.,
2012).
In humans, brain imaging has revealed that this area of
the PFC is activated in many different experimental paradigms,
each revealing a specific role in meeting the cognitive challenge
associated with a particular task. Thus, BA46-9/46 has been
reported to engage in tasks requiring, strategic deception in a
two-person bargaining game (Bhatt et al., 2010), concentration
(Koch et al., 2006), sustained monitoring and detection of
visuomotor incongruence (Schnell et al., 2007), arithmetic
processing (Menon et al., 2002), sustained attention to motion
(Thakral and Slotnick, 2009), imaging moving stimuli (Roland
and Gulyás, 1995; Goebel et al., 1998; Schendan and Stern, 2007),
counteracting susceptibility to proactive interference (Wolf et al.,
2010), integration demand and expectation of integration (De
Pisapia et al., 2007), high-level cognitive planning and mental
manipulation (Amiez and Petrides, 2007), maintenance of WM
and concentration requiring mental effort (Zarahn et al., 2005),
decisional processes governing oculomotor behavior (Pierrot-
Deseilligny et al., 2005), language switching (Wang et al.,
2007), maintenance of task performance in Tourette’s syndrome
(Marsh et al., 2007), selection from WM and of movements in
willed task actions (Rowe et al., 2000), active maintenance of
distractor-resistant memory (Sakai et al., 2002) and data-driven
scientific discovery (Zhong et al., 2011). Activation of the DLPFC
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or middle frontal gyrus (often interpreted as homologous to
BA46-9/46) has been reported when a task required executive
control (Kübler et al., 2006), low confidence, high risk decisions
requiring concentration (Fleck et al., 2006), verbal fluency
(Abrahams et al., 2003), manipulation of information (Marvel
and Desmond, 2010), the mental rotation of objects (Just
et al., 2001), automatic retrieval of technical problems and
breaking of mental sets (Dandan et al., 2013), self-control
(Friese et al., 2013), higher levels of cognitive control/processing
(Volle et al., 2008), a domain-independent, extra-mnemonic
device to focus attention on items to be remembered (Curtis
and D’Esposito, 2003), inhibition of the stereotyped responses
(Kadota et al., 2010), higher-order rule switching (Yoshida
et al., 2010) and critical cognitive control (Koric et al., 2012).
Lesions affecting BA46-9/46 have been reported to compromise
performance in simple spatial tasks suggesting deficits in
strategy or goal-based dysfunction (Bor et al., 2006), short-
term memory and the implementation of algorithmic strategy
(Chase et al., 2008), the scheduling of actions based on
online manipulation and maintenance of ongoing information
(Ptak and Schnider, 2004), higher levels of cognitive control
(Volle et al., 2008), executive function and fluid intelligence
(Roca et al., 2010) and creative thinking (Colombo et al.,
2015).
In general, these studies describe a BA46-9/46 that is activated
incrementally by cognitive load, indicating its participation in
maintaining mental effort, concentration, WM and attentional
focus all in the service of its overall role as the brain’s
executive center, upon which rests the responsibility of
strategic control over behavior. The activation of BA46-9/46
by, for example, low confidence decision making, switching
of language, manipulating information, evaluating equations,
focusing of attention or developing a strategy or executive
control, again indicate that beyond the need to elaborate
the appropriate behavior, this area is little concerned with
the concrete details of the material world. Rather, this area
appears to be engaged in elements of reason that involve the
evaluation and integration of theories, ideas or hypotheses
in a quest to formulate what can never be more than a
hypothesis regarding, most often, the behavioral strategy most
likely to bring reward to its host. One might postulate that
within BA46-9/46 entities such as space, form, magnitude
and time are manipulated as abstractions that embody their
generic properties rather than their concrete manifestations
at a particular moment (Medin et al., 2000). In this respect,
BA46-9/46 differs radically from the focus upon the concrete
properties of people and objects that is the primary concern
of BA47 (see: ‘‘The Origin of Practicality: The Material Mind’’
Section).
The word abstract, ‘‘existing in thought or as an idea but
not having a physical or concrete existence’’ (Stevenson and
Oxford University, 2010), best describes the domain of cognition
served by BA46-9/46—a domain that is developmentally driven
to embody intangible phenomena into what can only ever be a
hypothetical entities, be they physical entities, be they physical
entities such as gravity or a set of relationships hidden within a
mathematical function. Without such a domain of intelligence,
we would be unable to create intelligently-contrived hypotheses
that are the foundation for all significant scientific exploration
(Zhong et al., 2011). I therefore propose that the cortical area
responsible for exclusively elaborating the hypothetical, can best
be referred to as the abstract mind, an area of the cortex
responsible for our abstract intelligence that is a powerful
determinate of success in exploring the mysteries of our universe
and ourselves (Figure 1).
METACOGNITION AND GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE
Tests for general intelligence are designed to test a subject’s
power of reason, rather than their ability to recall or recognize
facts. When brain imaging is conducted on subjects challenged
with questions/tasks that are typical of tests for general
intelligence or Spearman’s G-factor, activation of BA46 is more
prominent than any other prefrontal areas (Duncan et al., 2000;
Gray et al., 2003; Wilke et al., 2003; Gray and Thompson, 2004).
Moreover, higher IQ has also been associated with the greater
activation of the DLPFC (Menon et al., 2002; Cho et al., 2012;
Metcalfe et al., 2013) and a greater thickness of the gray matter of
the middle prefrontal gyrus (Wilke et al., 2003; Narr et al., 2007;
Choi et al., 2008; Karama et al., 2009; MacLean, 2016). Given
that metacognitive ability has often been proposed to be related
to IQ (Berger and Reid, 1989; Alexander et al., 1995; Veenman
et al., 2004), these studies are highly suggestive that BA46-9/46 is
critical to both metacognition and general intelligence and that
these fundamental elements of cognition are indeed somewhat
interdependent.
Disruption of metacognition has been reported in patients
with lesions in right BA46 and BA10 while disrupting function
in the DLPFC using transcranial magnetic stimulation decreases
metacognitive ability (Rounis et al., 2010). Using brain imaging,
Baird et al. (2013) have concluded that, ‘‘. . .an individual’s
capacity for accurate introspection. . .is related to the functional
integrity of unique neural networks anchored in the medial
and lateral regions of the anterior PFC (aPFC)’’ (Baird et al.,
2013, p. 16657). Finally, Fleming et al. (2012) have demonstrated
activation of an area covering the boundary between BA10 and
BA46 in the right PFC accompanied by increased functional
connectivity to BA46 on the left during metacognition (Fleming
and Dolan, 2012).
Alternatively, Frith has proposed that metacognition involves
our contemplating the thoughts of others, a task known as
mentalizing, suggesting that this ‘‘. . . uniquely human ability
. . . has evolved through its enhancement of collaborative
decision-making’’ (Frith, 2012, p. 2213). As reviewed above
(see: ‘‘The Origin of Emotional Intelligence: The Social Mind’’
Section), mentalizing or performing Theory of Mind tasks
repeatedly activates BA9, thereby invoking the algorithms
of emotional intelligence. However, despite being severely
compromised in emotional intelligence (BA9) and, consequently,
their mentalizing abilities (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al.,
1995; Happe et al., 1996; Ohnishi et al., 2000; Shallice, 2001),
intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD, self-reported
abnormally high metacognitive abilities, presumably due to the
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retention in ASD of a functional BA46 and in these cases, a high
IQ (Grainger et al., 2014).
Many attempts have been made to expand the concept
of metacognition, resulting in terms such as ‘‘metacognitive
regulation’’ and ‘‘metacognitive knowledge’’ (Pearsall and
Trumble, 2002). However, in its simplest form metacognition
is defined as ‘‘Awareness and understanding of one’s own
thought processes’’ (Stevenson and Oxford University, 2010).
As the four cognitive areas, BAs 9, 10, 46 and 47 are all
intimately interconnected (Yeterian et al., 2012), metacognition
could theoretically occur when any domain of cognition receives
processed information from any other cognitive domain. In this
way, any one of these areas could engage in contemplation of
the cognitive processes (thoughts) being conducted in any of
the other three areas. Nevertheless, available data suggest that
metacognition is primarily the concern of the abstract mind
(BA46-9/46), perhaps working in concert with the temporal
mind (BA10) as a necessary part of strategic planning (see: The
Origin of the Future: The Temporal Mind Section) thus enabling
it to fulfil its function as the ultimate executor of behavior.
The findings that BA46-9/46 is primarily involved in
metacognition, implies that in its cognitive processes, it reflects
upon the cognitively-processed products of the other three
cognitive areas, BAs 9, 10 and 47 (Figure 2). It seems that, in
everyday life, while the abstract mind is engaged in establishing
hypotheses upon which to base future strategies, the social,
practical and temporal domains of cognition are receiving and
processing information about real, tangible elements within the
psychosocial, practical and temporal domains, that otherwise
encompass the cognitive life of humans. To put this in the
context of world knowledge, BAs 9, 47 and 10 are concerned
with establishing lower-order concepts; concepts that are derived
directly from, and that therefore embody, aspects of our social,
physical and temporal environment, including, in the case of
BA9, our internal, emotional reactions to it. In contrast, however,
I suggest that the processes in BA46-9/46 are concerned with
forming higher-order concepts; concepts that being derived from
the integration of sets of lower-order concepts, selected from any
or all of the other three cognitive areas (BAs 9, 10 or 47) in
circumstances that demand executive action (Figure 2).
It is important to appreciate that when a suite of lower-
order concepts arrive at BA46-9/46, they have meaning only in
so far as their use in the production of a hypothesis on the
best (most rewarding) behavioral strategy, given the prevailing
social, practical and temporal circumstances. For example,
should Newton’s apple fail to fall to earth, then our material,
temporal and, possibly even, our social domains of cognition
will be obliged to respond to this novel set of environmental
circumstances by embodying them into an entirely novel set
of lower-order concepts that will be relayed to the abstract
mind. To BA46-9/46, these, temporally-related, lower-order
concepts from three radically different domains of cognition
(psychosocial, material and temporal) must surely appear as
highly incongruent. However, having been developmentally
programmed to integrate intangible phenomena, the abstract
mind has neural circuitry that has been specifically tailored to
create higher-order concepts from dissonant sets of information
that, like those arriving from BAs 9, 10 and 47, are many
steps removed from the our perceptions of concrete entities
such as, color, size, form, sound, odor, taste and texture (see:
‘‘The Origin of Hypothesis: The Abstract Mind’’ Section). In
this situation, the abstract mind will create a new higher-
order concept that satisfactorily explains why objects do not fall
towards the earth—a hypothesis that will obviously be critical to
planning future strategies of behavior in this brave new world
(Figure 2).
While the circuitries of the neural networks that enable
cognition remain a mystery, two very promising lines of
investigation are the demonstration thatmicrostimulation within
single minicolumns of the monkey dorsolateral convexity
facilitates performance on cognitive tasks (Hampson et al., 2012)
and the potential to enhance creative thinking in humans by
transcranial stimulation of the DLPFC (Colombo et al., 2015).
If it can be shown that within BA46-9/46 of humans individual
minicolumns are selectively activated by particular hypothetical
challenges, we may move one step closer to: (a) understanding
the basis of our scientific creativity; and (b) creating an electronic
or biological system that, like the human mind, has the capacity
to integrate the hypothetical in the production of new testable
theories.
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